Trade in the worst of the worst times

22 December 2020

Read Stephen’s end of year round up for the Trade Works website:

“Out with the old, and in with the new”. The old saying seems to have particular relevance for 2020, a veritable annus horribilis for the global economy.  2021 can’t come fast enough, but while the vaccine portends better times to come,  many parts of the world remain in crisis as the year closes.

Trade plows through rough water

The Covid 19 virus caught the world unprepared and has had incalculable effects on people’s health and livelihoods:  too many precious lives have been lost and economies have been devastated.  Trade has been heavily disrupted as supply chains continue to come under pressure.  Protectionism was quick to rear its ugly head at an early stage as even supplies of much-needed medical equipment were blocked, but eventually wiser heads prevailed and markets remained largely open and trade continued to flow.   The WTO reports that global trade volumes bounced back in the third quarter from a deep slump in the second quarter – up 11.6 percent, as compared to – 12.7%, but still 5.6 % lower than the same time the previous year.

New Zealand’s trade has held up remarkably well this year, with some variations between products.  The trade surplus is the highest it has been for twenty years or more: imports are down sharply while exports are around 4.4% lower than this time last year (which was a bumper year for trade).  There is little doubt that trade saved New Zealand’s economic bacon in 2020, but constraints at ports and a growing lack of shipping are beginning to have a major effect.

Trade policy did not stand still 

It’s hard to keep a good trade policy down, and New Zealand negotiators pivoted very successfully during the initial impact of the crisis to negotiate a series of supply chain resilience agreements.  International organisations played their part too with the WTO, G20 and APEC all making supportive statements.  Some significant agreements were concluded this year including the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)signed virtually – of course – in June and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signed in November.  

Other negotiations are ongoing.  The NZ/EU FTA is the biggest of these with eight rounds of negotiations having been held, but the NZ/UK FTA is gathering speed, albeit in the uncertain environment created by Brexitwhich, as ever, is going down the wire.  Much attention was focused early in the year on an apparent truce in the trade war between the US and China,  

but this conflict has by no means gone away and may not be entirely resolved by an incoming Biden Administration.  New Zealand’s own relationship with China has been in the spotlight this year:  the NZ/China FTA upgrade has been completed but awaits signature.  As the year closes the World Trade Organisation – that great lifeboat for international trade – remains without a Director-General and without an Appellate Body, rendering the task of settling trade disputes that much more problematic. 

Enter APEC !

In this highly contested and uncertain environment, New Zealand takes the chair of APEC in 2021 and will do so virtually.  This is no mean feat for our Prime Minister, Ministers and senior officials but it gives us a chance to help lead the emergence from Covid and prepare the ground for the economic recovery.  Business is gearing up too as New Zealand also chairs the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC).   This will be major preoccupation for us in 2021 as ABAC provides an important opportunity to socialise important ideas and concepts and build alignment with other business leaders and groups around the region.  Global co-operation and collaboration have been critical during the pandemic and will be no less so during the recovery.

Keeping on keeping on 

Throughout this year it has been important to continue our work in support of trade and investment and to point out to New Zealanders (and anyone else listening) the importance of openness and integration.  We published 18 blogs on current issues, posted a raft of information to the Trade Works site and to our social media channels and updated the look and feel of the website as well as the content, with a view to the work we have to do with  ABAC next year.  The New Zealand election gave us the opportunity to publish background on the trade positions of the major parties.  We look forward to engaging with the new Government in the period ahead.

As the curtain falls on the most difficult year many of us have ever experienced, all the team at Trade Works extend our best wishes to all our readers for a restful holiday period and for a happier, healthier and more secure trading year in 2021.

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What does a Biden Presidency mean for New Zealand?

1 December 2020

In this article published by The Spinoff, Stephen assesses the impact of a Biden Presidency on New Zealand’s trade interests.

The American people have spoken.  America’s “better angels” have prevailed.  We all hope for better times ahead, but, while there is ample scope to expand co-operation with a Biden Administration in the White House, the future is unlikely to be all plain sailing.

The state of the relationship

The importance of the United States in international affairs is such that It is in New Zealand’s interest to co-operate with whoever occupies the White House.  The NZ/US relationship has continued to expand over the last four years. High level contacts have continued, although the Prime Minister herself has not yet made the customary visit to Washington. Security and defence relations are closer now than at any other time.  New Zealand and the US continue to be “very, very, very good friends.”  

Trade has flourished, even in the absence of an FTA.  Consumer demand for our products probably increased as a result of the economic stimulus flowing from the Trump Administration’s tax cuts.  Even Covid-19 has not made a dent in the trade figures.  True, the Administration disappointed us (and this writer in particular) on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP),  and continues to apply tariffs on our steel and aluminium exports, but with the KIWI Act it gave us visas for investors and entrepreneurs.  

New Zealand has not been immune from the fallout from the US/China trade war which has cast a shadow over the global economy.  We have also been concerned about US policies towards the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as multilateralism more generally, including, most importantly, withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.  The approach to  Iran and North Korea has been perplexing.  Co-operation in science, technology and education have all advanced, and our space co-operation has literally blasted off.  

Those annoying tariffs aside, the relationship is in good shape and ready for further development.

What do we want at this point?

There are a number of things that the Ardern Government might like to see from the US under a Biden Presidency, including:

  • Re-engagement in multilateral institutions, including the Paris Agreement and the WTO
  • Reduction of tension with China and re-alignment with Asia more generally
  • Partnership on global political, economic and environmental issues affecting us both 
  • Openness towards trade and investment.

Some of these seem assured given the Biden/Harris policy pronouncements; others will take time to eventuate: the processes required to get a new Administration up and running are labyrinthine by New Zealand standards.  It will take time to re-orient the ship of American policy.  New Zealand will need to take its turn, although our chairing of APEC in 2021 will give us some useful early opportunities to engage.

What about trade ?

We should not expect any early moves towards joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).   There are competing views on trade and President-elect Biden cannot be expected to want to disturb the Sandersistas in his party, at least not straight-away.

A bilateral FTA is no more likely in our view.  We have been down this path before, with both Republican and Democrat Administrations.  Somehow, no matter the quality of our friendship, we can never get the right conditions to allow an FTA to proceed.  That’s because we offer the Americans only a small market and our asks of the US are not without consequence domestically.  You only have to look at the importance of Wisconsin in the recent election to see that no favours affecting American dairy farmers are likely to be done for New Zealand.   The whole strategy with TPP – now CPTPP – was that the prospect of a bigger deal might serve to outweigh these domestic concerns.  As it turned out, TPP delivered only marginal agricultural market access and the Obama Administration was unable to get it passed through Congress.

The US may take a less aggressive stance on the WTO and New Zealand and the US could well co-operate on reforms aimed at improving the dispute settlement system rather than seeking to undermine it.  A return of US global leadership on trade is to be welcomed by New Zealand.  The multilateral trading system was after all one which the US helped build. 

Another area we can expect some welcome evolution in policy is in relation to China.  Although the Trump Administration’s tariffs have undeniably hurt America more than China, the perception of China as a strategic competitor cuts across the political divide.  We would expect a Biden Administration to continue to contest China’s economic, political and technological rise, but the policy could be pursued in a less confrontational way. That may not however lessen demands being made of very good friends like New Zealand.

What’s next ?

New Zealand and the United States have many shared interests, but America remains very divided, in the grip of a health and economic crisis and the “America first” movement has not gone away.  New Zealand has long pursued an independent foreign policy, but we value opportunities to work together. The relationship will continue to require close attention in the years ahead from Prime Minister Ardern, Foreign Minister Mahuta and Trade Minister O’Connor.  

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New Zealand’s real challenge with China

8 January 2020

Stephen stepped down from the role of Executive Director of the NZ China Council at the end of 2019. Here is his departing comment on the relationship, published in the NZ Herald on 20 December 2019.

No one can predict exactly what’s ahead for New Zealand’s relationship with China, but one thing is clear.  For the foreseeable future at least, China will become increasingly important to New Zealand.  To suggest otherwise is to ignore the role China now plays as a global power, and our place in an increasingly interconnected Asia Pacific. 

This presents us with tremendous opportunities, but also significant challenges.  To remain a truly valued and respected partner, we must find new ways to build relationship capital with China in areas beyond our traditional two-way trade in goods and services. 

Of course, trade remains the critical underpinning of New Zealand’s economic prosperity and trade with China will likely continue to grow.  Last year, we became China’s top food supplier globally, ahead of both Australia and the USA.  China wants to buy what New Zealand has to sell, and there is, fortunately, no reason to believe this will change any time soon. 

We need to continue to nurture our strengths in our key export sectors which generate the returns we need to fund economic and social development back home.   It’s harder than many commentators seem to realise to add value to the things we sell overseas, but genuine progress is being made.  The dairy industry, for example, is acutely aware of the need to diversify and much of what we sell, from cheese to infant formula, are premium products. 

The next generation of consumer offerings, particularly in the natural health sector and in the digital and creative space are now being established including by people who have the benefit of family and personal connections back in China.  As young people from both countries become more familiar with each other’s culture and language, this diversification in our trade will continue. 

The real risk to New Zealand’s relationship with China, in my opinion, comes less from having all our eggs in one Chinese basket, as some suggest, but rather that we focus so much on trade and the economic dimension that we underinvest in other, important areas.  

Three new areas of opportunity that New Zealand can leverage include cooperating with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), partnering on programmes to tackle the threat of climate change and greater cooperation in science and technology. 

BRI is China’s project to promote development-led growth between China and the rest of the world.  BRI is not just about infrastructure: it’s a framework for expanding connectivity amongst all the BRI participants.  We can’t build a physical bridge between China and New Zealand – we can find ways to help goods, services, people and capital move along the Belt and Road.

An initiative where New Zealand can add real value due to our unique geographic location and the expertise we have developed as a result.  Thanks to our existing ties with both China and South America, the concept of New Zealand as a ‘Southern Link’, or major conduit between the two for trade, travel and tourism is now gaining traction especially in moving e-commerce parcels between China and South America through Auckland.  

On climate change, Minister Shaw has spoken of the potential for the joint research agenda between China and New Zealand to become a global example for others to follow.  We have a huge advantage in renewable energy generation, an area in which China is investing aggressively.  China has expertise in electric vehicles. Greater cooperation to bring down emissions in both countries will give each of us a stake in solving a massive global problem.  

More broadly in science, the health sector has given us a template for how we can partner with China in new ways.  Recently, a group of health researchers and experts from Shandong province met with the Waitematā District Health Board to open lines of cooperation from hospital and nursing practices to data and technology application.  The commercialisation of local knowledge and research with Chinese partners is an area we’re only just beginning to explore. 

The more we expand the range and depth of these links with China, the more we can build up our relationship capital and help our Chinese friends see us as a more than just a provider of goods and services – things that one day they might choose to get elsewhere.

I am confident our relationship can also withstand our obvious differences on serious issues like human rights and regional security.  While in 2019 these differences have been thrown into sharp relief a number of times, New Zealand has not been silent on the values we hold.  The task ahead is to strengthen our capacity to make our independent voice heard including with big global players like China.  

The point is we can effectively de-risk the entire relationship by looking actively for new areas of cooperation.  This will not only help alleviate risk from a trade perspective:  importantly, it will also help us negotiate points of political difference more maturely and effectively.

This is New Zealand’s real challenge with China.  Maintaining our most important trading relationship by building strength and resilience into areas beyond trade.  This is the only way for New Zealand to see beyond its obvious differences with China to what can be achieved for the long-term benefit of both countries. 

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NZ/China – is our next big earner in front of us?

5 May 2019

 As published in the NZ Herald on 3 April 2019.

Next month, hard on the heels of the Prime Minister, Trade Minister David Parker sets off for China for the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.  He’ll join leaders from a large number of other countries keen to explore new opportunities under the biggest and most ambitious trade and development initiative we’ve seen for decades.

The timing is perfect.  Now the Prime Minister has visited, we are moving on from earlier uncertainty in the relationship.  We have the chance to take another step forward by demonstrating to our partners in China the unique value we can add to the Belt and Road Initiative.

What is that unique value going to be?  Clearly, we need big ideas to stand out.  We’re far removed from the trade routes most often associated with Belt and Road, linking China and other Asian countries and Asia and Europe.  As a developed economy we won’t be the recipient of concessionary finance for infrastructure.  We’re global traders, with other important relationships to nurture and a strong belief in the multilateral trading system and the rights of small economies in the international order.

But we may have a big and original idea, one that’s right in front of our noses.  It’s about making New Zealand a major and natural connection between China and South America – we’re calling it the Southern Link.

The numbers point to some serious opportunity.  Links between China and South America are booming, with plans to increase trade and investment significantly.  Putting New Zealand into this picture could mean increased passenger transit and airfreight, building on our expertise in trade and customs facilitation and supply chain connectivity.

It may sound idealistic.  We’re a geographically isolated country so we’ve never been seriously considered as a hub for global travel or trade.  It will come with major challenges.  But several factors play into our hand which make the possibility of a Southern Link a lot more realistic.

People movement between China and South America is increasing, but there are no direct flights. Broadly at the halfway point, New Zealand, whether Auckland or Christchurch, provides the shortest flight distance between certain Chinese and South American cities, including important routes between Shanghai, Guangzhou, Santiago, Buenos Aires and further afield.

A Southern Link could help assist and simplify e-commerce and traditional parcel post which criss-crosses the oceans between China and South America in ever-growing quantities.  In terms of tripartite cooperation, the idea also feeds into our goal of deepening our relationships in South America, building on CPTPP and the Pacific Alliance with Chile, Mexico and Peru.  While we have ample connectivity between China and New Zealand, boosting the connectivity between South America and New Zealand with added Chinese volume and capacity could lead to a host of new connections.

It shows the Belt and Road isn’t just about hitching your wagon to China’s star, either.  It doesn’t involve any surrender of sovereignty or raise the spectre of “debt diplomacy”.  What the initiative offers is the chance to build greater connections with other participating countries on a regional or even a global basis.

A conference to take place in Auckland on 25 June will explore the business case and value proposition for the Southern Link in more detail.  The NZ China Council and the Latin America NZ Business Council are teaming up with partners in China, Chile and Argentina to bring major players and decision-makers together.

For a century and a half, New Zealand has managed to turn its natural advantages into valuable export business.  We’ve overcome the tyranny of distance and transformed our economy into one that is outward looking and diverse.  Building the Southern Link represents yet another chance to turn the Kiwi number eight wire mentality into economic opportunity.

 

 

 

 

 

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What is the new normal in New Zealand’s relationship with China?

8 March 2019

On 26 February 2019 The Spinoff published Stephen’s article outlining recent developments in the relationship with China.  Read what he had to say here.

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Trade in 2018 – still looking for that star !

19 December 2018

Just as well the magi didn’t face tariffs at the border !  Here’s Stephen’s end of year round up!

 2018 will not go down in history as a good year for trade.  While international businesses struggled on, they did so against a backdrop of rising protectionism and all-out trade war between the world’s two largest economies. Will 2019 be any different?

 It sometimes said that not much changes in trade from year to year.  Not so in 2018 which was a year of two halves.

On the more positive side, some important new trade agreements were concluded.  Of course, here in New Zealand we’re thrilled about CPTPP* – a veritable mouthful of a trade agreement.  Rivalling it, if not in substance then at least in terms of an unpronounceable acronym, was USMCA*between US, Mexico and Canada – described unflatteringly by one commentator as “NAFTA O.8”. Then there was the linguistically more adventurous JEEPA – the Japan EU Economic Partnership Agreement.  Hats off to our Japanese friends – with CPTPP and JEEPA they have shown real global leadership in the cause of trade liberalisation (even if on agriculture they still need to fully overcome their worst instincts).

Trade restrictions, trade war, trade divorces

On the decidedly less positive side, protectionism has been let off the leash with trade restrictive measures in 2017-18 now seven times larger than recorded by the WTO in the previous period.  While the end of the year showed some, possibly only temporary, alleviation of the US China dispute, the consequences of the trade war have been felt in markets around the world as well as in the domestic economies of both presenting countries.  The impact on the WTO itself is most concerning. And de-stablising forces in the global trade architecture have also been felt in Europe, as the Brexit process has ground its way painfully towards an acrimonious UK-EU divorce.

What’s next for trade?

Where to for 2019?   The year will start on a positive note – CPTPP will enter into force for the six signatories with a first round of tariff cuts on 30 December with a second round for all except Japan on 1 January.  Japan’s second round of cuts will take place on 1 April. For Viet Nam entry into force and the two rounds of cuts take place on 14 January.  We expect at least one further accession to CPTPP in 2019, starting with the most likely candidate -Thailand.

Other important negotiations will continue during the year.  We are hopeful of progress with NZ/EUbut we are aware that these things take time and nothing will be concluded until everything is concluded.  We would be bold to forecast a conclusion to RCEP given past delays, but Ministers are on record saying this will happen by the end of the year.

On Brexit, who can possibly say what will happen?  There are differing views in our own team (here in the South Pacific!) but, notwithstanding the current polls, it does seem possible that calls for a second referendum will grow in intensity the closer we get to 29 March.    In November we published a discussion paper on New Zealand’s interest in a future FTA with the UK but much will depend on whether the UK exits the EU as planned on 29 March and on the shape of the future UK-EU relationship to be negotiated.  We forecast continuing uncertainty next year which is in itself corrosive to business and investor confidence.

Not out of the woods yet

We are not out of the woods on the trade war. President Trump’s dinner with President Xi at the G20 Summit resulted in a 90 day period during which both countries will refrain from new tariffs and return to the negotiating table.  That is positive, but a much-anticipated speech by President Xi on 18 December on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening up will perhaps have disappointed – no new measures were announced to address issues in the Chinese economy which cause concern not just for the US, but others as well.

Come next December we hope we are in a better place than today.  Trade negotiators like the magi continue to follow the star.  Let’s hope like them we can continue to move across borders without disruption!

*   (1) CPTPP = Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans Pacific Partnership

(2) USMCA = United States, Mexico, Canada Agreement

(3)  RCEP = Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

 

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Watch Stephen discuss the implications of the US/China trade war

14 July 2018

Stephen and Liam Dann, NZ Herald, discuss the fall-out from the first shots fired in Trump’s trade war:

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NZ China Council releases Belt and Road report

1 May 2018

On 1 May 2018 Stephen joined in launching the NZ China Council’s report “Belt and Road Initiative – A Strategic Pathway”, prepared by PwC.  Full details can be found at www.beltandroad.co.nz. Here’s what Stephen had to say at the launch:

It is a pleasure to be able to join in launching this report today and I want to add my thanks to Colum Rice and the PwC team, as well as our other partners who have worked together to help build this strategic pathway for New Zealand’s engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative.

I’m sure you all know already that BRI is aimed at achieving development-led growth along ancient trade routes linking China across Eurasia to Europe, as well as more modern trade routes including from China across the South Pacific to New Zealand and on to Latin America.

What is not so well known is how a distant nation like New Zealand can co-operate with this initiative and how it can add value to New Zealand’s relationship with China and other countries along the Belt and Road.

That is the purpose of this report.

In March 2017, New Zealand and China signed a Memorandum of Arrangement (MoA) under which the two countries undertook to explore ways of working together in relation to BRI.

In August 2017, the Council commissioned PwC under the leadership of Colum Rice to prepare a report which placed BRI in context for New Zealand and set out a range of options to enhance connectivity with China and other BRI countries.

The options outlined in the report are not intended to be exhaustive but an illustrative indication of what could be developed under this new framework.

Our intention is to begin a discussion with New Zealand stakeholders about BRI and we are starting this discussion today.

Having spent some time now thinking about the place of New Zealand in BRI, it seems to me that the best place to begin is not with a map of trade routes.

There are multiple maps in circulation about BRI and most of them manage not to include New Zealand!

Our report does have a map, as you see here, a rather complicated one, with New Zealand and the Pacific firmly on it.

For New Zealand, the starting point for any discussion of Belt and Road really has to be the positive relationship between China and New Zealand which has grown significantly in recent years and more particularly since the conclusion of our groundbreaking FTA.

As we consider the future of the relationship, it is clear to us at the NZ China Council that the future is not likely to be a continuation of the past.

For New Zealand, the strategic context for our consideration of BRI is how we can maintain the momentum of the relationship into the future.

Today New Zealand is facing greater competition than ever for attention in China.

Australia has negotiated a very good FTA, Chile has already upgraded its FTA, European states are making a huge push to develop people-to-people links, and countries in Europe, Asia and even Latin America are already staking out their roles in the BRI.

Our relationship with China is not just about trade and investment and nor is BRI.

What is clear is that BRI is at the centre of Chinese policy and at the very core of China’s country to country relationships.

BRI matters to China and therefore, if we want to continue to expand our relationship, it has to matter to New Zealand as well.

At the time of writing some 69 countries and organisations had identified that they wish to co-operate with China in BRI – the number has continued to expand to more than 80 today.

BRI is not without its sceptics and critics so we also need to be alert to the implications of a fundamentally bilateral initiative, with China at the centre, for the region’s wider trade and economic architecture, as well as any reputational or geo-strategic risks that might arise.

Our report identifies these risks and we have considered them in relation to the specific opportunities we have presented for further discussion.

It is really up to each country to decide for itself the extent to which they choose to engage with BRI.

Having already signaled a willingness to consider engaging with BRI, we in New Zealand must now do the work to determine the depth and breadth of our engagement, consistent with our interests and our values.

BRI is dynamic and continues to evolve as the priorities and interests of China and other Belt and Road countries change.

This changing nature of BRI means it can be challenging to define clearly the opportunities it presents and hence the need for guidance such as that offered in this report.

BRI is perhaps best known for its massive infrastructure construction programme, but it is important to note, as you see here, that infrastructure is only one of five policy priorities under BRI.

It is in the area of connectivity that the Council believes BRI could provide a significant opportunity for New Zealand.

This does not mean that there will not be opportunities in the infrastructure space, both in New Zealand and offshore, but the emphasis in this report is how we can leverage BRI to expand and enhance connectivity with China and other countries along the Belt and Road.

As well as putting BRI in context for New Zealand the report identifies a number of opportunities that can be further developed in a BRI framework.

As noted earlier these opportunities are not designed to be exhaustive but indicative of the range of projects that could be developed.

PwC engaged with our stakeholder group, to capture, first of all, a range of actionable options by identifying a wide variety of initiatives that New Zealand could pursue.

PwC then helped us narrow down the suite of possible options by assessing them against six key criteria:

  • Alignment with New Zealand’s comparative advantage
  • Value to New Zealand – with a weighting to those options which had broader application in BRI
  • Ease of implementation
  • Potential to interest our Chinese partners
  • Benefits vs costs
  • Reputational risk

The outcome of this “diverge/converge” process is eight specific opportunities grouped under four categories

Each of these has been assessed against the criteria and presents, we believe, a viable opportunity for New Zealand to engage with BRI.

All the categories are in connectivity space:

  • trade facilitation (incorporating biosecurity, customs clearance and supply chain hubbing)
  • New Zealand as a conduit to Latin America
  • innovation; and
  • the creative sector

Trade facilitation could leverage our world class biosecurity regime, expertise in cross border movement of goods, and experience in working across jurisdictions in supply chain hubs.

Our geographic location and existing trade and tourism relationships with China and South America position us well as a natural connection between the two.

In the innovation space, New Zealand can utilise its strong capability in science and technology and advance our existing collaboration and promote greater commercialization of ideas.

For the creative sector, opportunities exist to use creative strengths in web solutions, gaming and other properties to expand people to people links, cultural awareness, understanding and exchange.

These opportunities can be implemented by the two governments, agencies, cities or the private sector.

Under each category the report provides some further ideas that could be explored, representing different levels of engagement.

Some might well ask – aren’t these things we are doing already and the answer is yes!

But BRI is about leverage – how can we focus the attention of partners in China on these opportunities and open up new sources of support and funding by placing existing work streams in a BRI framework.

Going forward, we are particularly keen to engage with any groups interested to be part of the conversation and thinking about how they can be involved in BRI.

We are planning a series of discussions around the country with interested stakeholders – a Christchurch event will be held on 17 May and events in other centres will follow from July.

This morning we are also launching a dedicated Belt and Road page on the Council website which can serve as a repository for our report and New Zealand-related information and commentary about BRI.

The page – which will enable you to download the report itself – can be accessed from our website at www.nzchinacouncil.com or directly from www.beltandroad.co.nz.

The web page will help deepen New Zealanders’ understanding of BRI and inform the discussions we will be having around the country.

BRI represents an opportunity for New Zealand.

It is an opportunity which is up to us to grab hold of or leave to others.

We need to move forward aware of both opportunities and risks and determine how it serves our national interest to be involved.

The China Council hopes this report is the beginning of a national conversation and looks forward to pursuing that conversation with the Government and interested groups around New Zealand

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What is China’s New Silk Road ?

11 July 2017

Watch Stephen explain China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative to Eric Young on TV3’s AM Show on 11 July 2017

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We cannot afford short term thinking with China says Stephen Jacobi

28 March 2017

Read Stephen’s article in the NZ Herald calling for NZ/China relations to be more diverse and sustainable – here

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