Address to the 47th One Stop Update for the Accountant in Business

In October 2020 Stephen spoke to accountants’ conferences in Christchurch and Wellington: here are his remarks:

GLOBAL ECONOMIC UPDATE: TRENDS, SHIFTS AND IMPACTS ON NEW ZEALAND’S BUSINESS LANDSCAPE

It’s good to be with you again at this 47h One Stop Update event. My thanks to Conferenz for having me back.

When I spoke to this group last year, I took on the role of a weather-forecaster.

As I looked over global landscape, with the shadow of the US/China trade war and a rising risk of protectionism, I issued a warning – cyclone approaching – but I definitely missed something.

This year I’d be better off being an epidemiologist.

What just happened ?

A small item in the Economist of 11 January read as follows:

“Almost 60 cases of pneumonia in the Chinese city of Wuhan were thought to be linked to a new strain of the virus that caused the SARS epidemic in 2002-03. Unlike then, no-one else has yet died from the disease.  The WHO is investigating…”

This global pandemic caught us unprepared and has left havoc in its wake.

All analyses, forecasts and outlooks are having to be revised – for most we may as well start over again from scratch because, let’s face it, 2020 has been brought to us by the letters W, T and F and we ain’t seen nothing like this before.

2020 has become a wasteland of hopes and dreams.

We haven’t previously seen – at least not since 1918 – such a devastating health impact and crippling effect on local economies.

We have not ever seen such a shock to the global economy or global supply chains, nor the fall out on formerly strong sectoral performers like tourism and international education. 

Curiously though there has been some, albeit faint, light on the horizon.

We’ve seen, despite some initial hesitations and some variation between sectors, markets for our key goods exports remain open and performing.

We’ve seen traditional industries and some key markets largely save the day when it comes to our economy.

We’ve seen too some strong policy actions on the part of our Government aimed at shoring up supply chains and continuing the task of keeping trade flowing.

The question for us now is what we can do to weather the continuing storm in this incredibly uncertain environment

Working out “What’s next” has never been easy and while I’m not here to predict the future, I’d like to unpack some of this further with you and I look forward to the conversation that will follow.

In the wasteland 

At the outset we should note the tragic loss of life and human potential which have been caused by the pandemic, which has yet to run its course around the world.

Words fail to express the sorrow at the loss of 25 fellow New Zealand citizens, let alone the over 1 million global citizens whose lives have been prematurely ended.

That such a tragedy could befall us at a time when the world is more advanced scientifically, more connected globally and more prosperous economically than at any other time in history will be something for historians, philosophers and economists to ponder in the decades to come.

The scarring of this sort of catastrophe cannot be measured just in accounting terms (if you’ll foregive the expression) – the human cost is simply incalculable.

The global economy is reeling.

Never before have all parts of the global economy suffered a shock at the same time.  Never before have both supply and demand been affected at once.

Most countries have been suddenly plunged into recession: the World Bank says that growth will contract by between 5.2 percent and 8 percent in 2020 and that the COVID-19 recession has seen the fastest, steepest downgrades in consensus growth projections among all economies since 1990[1].

While developed economies have certainly not been spared, developing economies have been hardest hit :  for over 25 years world poverty has been steadily declining but now, the World Bank says, the deadly combination of Covid and climate change could in 2020 drastically increase the number of people living in extreme poverty by 88 million to 115 million[2]

Here in New Zealand our economy declined by 12.2 percent in the last quarter.

Even with a strong rebound expected after the ending of the lockdown in Auckland, the economy is still expected to shrink significantly this year, perhaps by as much as 5.6 percent before rebounding in 2021.

Here as elsewhere some sectors have been hit harder than others –international tourism and education, hospitality and entertainment, the creative industries property, construction, manufacturing to name just a few.

Around the world the loss of air and sea-freight connections has seen supply chains tested to breaking point with many businesses looking now to re-shore some critical manufacturing operations.

The pandemic has caused major disruption to food production and distribution resulting in bottle-necks along the entire food supply chain.

Throughout the pandemic a high level of policy uncertainty has existed. 

The protectionist reflex, already present in the pre-Covid world, became initially even more manifest as economies looked to protect local supplies of essential health equipment, from sanitiser to PPE to soap and even food.

As the crisis began several economies placed restrictions on food exports, including eggs, rice and grains. 

Fortunately, by August most of these restrictions had been removed.

This was due to a lot of pressure from international organisations like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, G20 and APEC which did the job we needed them to do and called for markets to be kept open and trade flowing.

As bad as it has been, there have been one or two glimpses of light in the darkness.

In April this year the best estimate of the World Trade Organisation was that trade would drop by 12.9 percent in 2020: a new forecast suggests the drop will be more like 9.2 percent, with trade rebounding by 7 percent in 2021 but still remaining below the pre-crisis trend[3].

Interestingly for New Zealand, the trade decline in Asia is expected to be less – at 4.5 percent.

All these forecasts of course are predicated on the absence of a resurgence in the pandemic; as we see in the United States, Europe, South America and India, the worst may be far from over.

New Zealand’s trade has held up remarkably well also.

Our key exports of dairy, meat and fruit are all higher this year than last year, but exports of forestry and seafood are down. 

In the year to August 2020 New Zealand’s total annual exports were up 2.8 percent from the same period the previous year and total annual imports were down 8.2 percent[4].

Our traditional exports of agricultural and food products have been saving our bacon during this crisis and a big shout out needs to go to our farmers and exporters.

Key markets especially China have performed well and exports to Japan have been growing strongly as the market has opened under the Trans Pacific Partnership.

Generally speaking, our markets have remained open to us in a regulatory sense – again proving the worth of the free trade agreements which today cover over 64 percent of exports and eight out of our top ten markets.

Exporters have faced problems in terms of disruptions to supply chains including logistical delays at ports, time delays with courier services and bottlenecks in inspection and storage.

Some jurisdictions are putting in place new certification requirements and exporters need to keep in close touch with their customs agents and NZ officials about these in case they become unjustified non-tariff barriers to trade.

Several sectors are also facing critical shortages of skilled and unskilled labour including RSE workers to pick fruit, people required in meat processing plants or to service equipment in factories and seafarers to work on the fishing fleet – these shortages are going to become more acute as the border closure continues and could threaten the export-led recovery.

It has to be said that NZ Government agencies over this time have been noticeably attentive to exporters’ needs.  

The Government has adopted a Trade Recovery Strategy focusing on retooling exporter support, rebuilding the network of trade agreements and refreshing key relationships.

Regular updates have been held with business represenatives to maintain a check on the pulse of trade and any problems both onshore and offshore that have arisen.

At an early stage temporary steps were taken to ensure air routes remained open both for exports and imports[5] and a number of supply chain connectivity arrangements were negotiated with key overseas partners.

Sone problems remain to be addressed: several sectors are facing critical shortages of skilled and unskilled labour including RSE workers to pick fruit, people required in meat processing plants or to service equipment in factories and seafarers to work on the fishing fleet – these shortages are going to become more acute as the border closure continues and could threaten the export-led recovery.

With Covid there came a risk that some of our partners’ worst protectionist instincts might have been awakened – by and large this has been avoided, but that protectionist reflex has not gone away.

Geo-political tensions that were smouldering pre-Covid have broken out into more aggressive firefights – the US/China relationship for example is at a worse point today than at any other time in history.

The shadow of the US/China trade war is getting longer and darker.

It is very easy at tense moments like this for trade to get caught in the cross-fire, as Australian farmers have found out recently.

This requires care in handling sensitive international relationships – we are not out of the woods yet.

It is too early to tell yet how long the current uncertainty might last.

That is very cold comfort indeed for those in the international tourism and education sectors whose revenues will simply not recover fully until borders re-open we can travel freely again.

That will depend on the ability of governments around the world to improve their response to the pandemic and the availability and distribution of vaccines and therapies.

Progress is doubtless being made but not at the speed which is needed.

In the light of that uncertainty what can be done to weather the storm?

It is pretty clear that effective domestic policy action is a pre-requisite for addressing the pandemic, but equally clear that no country working on its own has all the solutions.

This is a time when we need governments and international institutions to come together as never before – our lives literally depend on it.

Unfortunately, it is a time when distrust between the major powers is at an all-time high.

Since pre-Covid we were worried that the larger economies could not demonstrate global economic leadership, it is hardly surprising that today they lack the wherewithal to show global political leadership.

Yet, out of adversity can come opportunity and there is today a new role for smaller players like New Zealand working with others to bring together coalitions to focus on what is needed to set the stage for an eventual re-opening of borders as health circumstances permit and get the global economy moving again.

This requires New Zealand to continue to pay close attention to international affairs – even during an election campaign and formation of a new government – and to navigate carefully between super-power rivalry.

It requires us to continue the hard and sometimes frustrating work of opening new markets as we are doing today through negotiations with the European Union, the United Kingdom, as well as partners in Asia and Latin America.

Those negotiations are not easy.

An FTA with the European Union would bring significant benefits, and enable us to address some new issues, but it is still not clear whether our European friends are prepared to open their market to us for agricultural products.

Similarly, the prospect of a potentially valuable FTA with post-Brexit Britain depends entirely on the outcome of Britain’s negotiations with the EU and the direction of Britain’s future trade policy.

A very large negotiation with Asian economies – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – alas excluding India – will deliver some important liberalisation amongst the fifteen partners but not so much for New Zealand which already has good arrangements in Asia.

A negotiation with the Pacific Alliance of Latin American economies is making only slow progress.

If the big wins from new agreements feel somewhat elusive right now, there is other work to be done.

We should continue to focus on updating existing arrangements that have served us well such as with China and ASEAN and expanding the CPTPP.

We should even now to start to look for new partners further afield in Africa and Eurasia.

We should think ahead to new types of arrangements which can address new business models particularly in the digital space.

Trade policy and free trade agreements are important – critically so as without market access and effective trade rules trade cannot take place – but they need to be accompanied by domestic policies that develop capacity, increase productivity and competitiveness and spur new investment, including from overseas.

We are now in time where we simply cannot afford bad policy and poor investment decisions.

We may have beaten the virus, not once but twice, but securing the economic recovery will be a test of our collective endeavour and political will to make the right decisions.

In that context I want to highlight a particular opportunity that is before us in 2021 when New Zealand will chair APEC and for the first time, we will chair it virtually.

APEC or Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation provides an opportunity for New Zealand to show political and economic leadership at a critical time for the economic recovery, to work co-operatively with some of the world’s largest economies and our major trading partners and to draw on a wealth of experience and ideas to find the best solutions to address the Asia Pacific region’s critical needs.

APEC has 21 member economies who are vital economic partners for New Zealand, normally taking around 73 percent of our exports and accounting for 70 percent of our imports. 

Fourteen of our top 20 export markets are APEC members, including the three largest economies in the world (the United States, China and Japan).  

APEC is not just the domain of governments – APEC’s business voice is provided by the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC).

Three ABAC Members from each economy provide recommendations direct to APEC’s Economic Leaders:  New Zealand’s ABAC Members are Rachel Taulelei, Malcolm Johns and Toni Moyes and I have the honour to advise them and lead the ABAC executive team next year.

ABAC has a role to play in focusing APEC on what is needed to rejuvenate economic activity throughout the Asia Pacific region including, critically at this time, a strong vision for the future of a highly inter-connected region, enhanced co-operation between economies and new openness to trade and investment.

Under the theme of Tāngata, Taio me te Taurikura, (People, Place and Prosperity) we’ll be developing new ideas about trade and investment, about renewable energy and responses to climate change, about Māori and indigenous business, about the digital economy and about open and inclusive financial systems.

To do this effectively, we will want to get the sort of input and perspectives from the New Zealand business community that will make the agenda practical and business-led.

You can find out more about our programme on the Trade Works website – www.tradeworks.org.nz.

The move to a virtual hosting format is certainly a challenge but it will hopefully also demonstrate New Zealand’s ability to innovate in the digital space. 

Above all we will want to host APEC and ABAC in 2021 in a way that is distinctively Aotearoa, which creates a legacy going forward and which enhances the success of NZ business in the region, no matter their size or scale.

APEC is a big opportunity but to really deliver in 2021 we have to focus on what is most important – building the economic recovery.

The fact of the matter is we don’t know what is ahead of us – other than that at some unknown time the immediate crisis will come to an end.

Covid has removed a lot of the old certainties and assumptions.

Stamping out the virus and rebuilding will likely take time.

We will need to keep doing what works – both at home and abroad.

We also need to prepare better for future challenges like this one – listening to both the epidemiologists and the weather forecasters and, critically, remaining open and continuing to look outwards.


[1] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/08/the-global-economic-outlook-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-changed-world

[2] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/10/07/global-action-urgently-needed-to-halt-historic-threats-to-poverty-reduction

[3] https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr862_e.htm

[4] https://www.stats.govt.nz/reports/new-zealand-now-overseas-trade-at-september-2020

[5] https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-working-keep-air-freight-moving

Back to the Future? New Zealand, the European Union and Britain

On 19 February Stephen spoke to the Hawke’s Bay Branch of the NZ Institute of International Affairs about New Zealand’s trade relationships with the European Union and Britain. Here is what he had to say:

 

ADDRESS TO THE HAWKE’S BAY BRANCH OF THE

NZ INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HAVELOCK NORTH, 19 FEBRUARY 2019 

STEPHEN JACOBI

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

NZ INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS FORUM

BACK TO THE FUTURE?  NEW ZEALAND, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BRITAIN

 

Thanks to my friend Dick Grant for the kind invitation to speak to you today.

It’s great to be back in Hawke’s Bay again and talking with you about trade and economic opportunities, not this time with the United States, or China, or Japan, but with old friends in Europe.

So, are we no longer doing Asia, some of you may be tempted to ask?

I can assure you we most certainly are “doing Asia”, not just because of the enormous potential which is still on offer closer to home but because we live today in an increasingly complex and inter-dependent world, which requires us to pursue multiple opportunities at once and to mitigate risks across a range of markets.

The free trade agreement we are now pursuing with the European Union is part of that strategy, but it is not aimed at replacing markets in Asia but supplementing them and hopefully also giving rise to new productive investment which can help us develop new and profitable areas of business.

I’d like to examine this further with you by first looking more closely at the rationale for an FTA with the EU, then some of the potential problems, which might complicate the negotiation more than some politicians would like to admit, and finally and briefly, because I know you’ve recently heard from the British High Commissioner, at how Brexit might change our relationship with Britain.

Rationale of the NZ/EU FTA

 It’s true that the idea of an NZ EU FTA has a sort of “back to the future” feel about it.

I began my career over thirty years ago working on trade with Europe including four years at the NZ Embassy in Paris.

Much of that time New Zealand faced an uphill battle to secure ongoing butter and sheepmeat access to Britain which involved annual visits by NZ Prime Ministers and Ministers to Brussels.

This matter was resolved in 1995 in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations – or at least we thought it was, as it now rears its head again in the context of Brexit.

I’ll talk about that a little more in a moment, but, for now, let’s just reflect that those annual negotiations coloured our relations with the EU for many years, when we saw each other as competitors rather than partners.

This tended to obscure both the continuing economic importance of Europe even as we sought as an urgent matter of national economic survival to diversify our markets.

It is supremely ironic that today we hear similar calls for diversification – away from Asia and back to Europe!

Despite all this, the 28 (for the time being) member states of the European Union constitute a510-million strong consumer market, ranking as our third-largest export destination, our second biggest supplier of imports, and our second-largest source of investment, with strong people-to-people linkages.

The rules governing our trade are however 30 years old and that puts our exporters at a distinct disadvantage especially when compared to competitors whose countries have concluded FTAs with the EU.

By the way it also puts EU exporters to New Zealand at a disadvantage as we have concluded FTAs with China and others which have resulted in a loss of market share for the EU especially in machinery, high tech manufacturing and a range of services.

More than one European diplomat in Wellington has lamented this sad state of affairs to me over the years – well, trade flows in both directions and this FTA negotiation is a chance to put that right.

New Zealand and Australia, which is negotiating separately with the EU, are almost the last cabs off the rank with the EU which has had a very active negotiating agenda over the years.

One wonders why it has taken so long – possibly because of lingering perceptions about being competitors rather than partners – but the good news is that the current EU leadership, as was made clear to the Prime Minister recently, sees this negotiation as a matter of priority.

Although it would be flattering to think so, this is not so much about the potential of our small domestic market – it has more to do with geo-politics and the opportunity this FTA gives to demonstrate openness to trade at a time when others are turning inwards, and to fashion some next generation commitments that can address today’s trade challenges.

For example, both New Zealand and the EU share a commitment to advancing “trade for all”: how, at a time of increasing scepticism about trade, how can we find ways of making trade work for people and addressing the specific needs of those groups who previously may have been left on the side-lines, including smaller business, women and in our case Maori.

Or reflecting new models of doing business, how can we address the needs of the digital economy, promoting cross border digital trade and e-commerce while respecting privacy and upholding cybersecurity?

That’s the rhetoric anyway but it does point to a more strategic context for this negotiation which will be helpful in Brussels when the rubber hits the road and we get down, as inevitably we will do, to the hard tacks of the negotiation.

From a New Zealand perspective, this negotiation is an opportunity also to promote and advance growing exports of high-quality food products including horticulture and wine, services such as tourism, education and creative sector exports, and well as high-tech and niche manufacturing.

The export boost at the New Zealand end is likely to be significant, with EU modelling suggesting the deal could add up to 0.5 percent to New Zealand’s GDP – a gain of up to $2 billion, giving rise to better jobs and living standards for New Zealanders.

But we should not see this simply in two way trade terms.

There is also huge scope to develop and deepen global value chains spanning from Europe through New Zealand into the Asia-Pacific incorporating the best of our complementary goods, services, capital, R&D, technology, ideas and innovation to service customers beyond both of our shores.

The EU is already a significant investor, although behind Australia, China and the United States – more can be done to boost the investment partnership and although the FTA will not at this stage include investment disciplines, it should help focus greater commercial attention on these wider possibilities.

Potential obstacles

 Both governments are on record as saying the FTA should be able to be concluded quickly.

That would indeed be an achievement – I have never seen an FTA concluded quickly, but I certainly hope we can avoid the long, drawn-out process associated with the Trans Pacific Partnership for example.

Trade agreements take ages to conclude because they are complex – even more so when a number of countries are involved.

In the case of the EU, the European Commission negotiates on behalf of the Union but behind them, every step of the way, sit the 28 (or maybe 27) member states which all have their own interests to protect and advance.

Some of those interests in the EU’s agricultural producing nations are not necessarily enthusiastic about the detail of what might be included in an FTA with New Zealand.

That’s why the preparatory steps towards the negotiation have literally taken years –  I visited Brussels in 2010 because we thought the negotiation was getting closer!

Hopefully these careful preparations will pay off because this negotiation will inevitably throw up some difficult issues.

Let me mention just three of them.

The first has to do with those tariff rate quotas for sheepmeat, beef and dairy products which are the legacy of New Zealand’s trade with Britain since colonial times and which after a generation of effort were finally settled and secured in the World Trade Organisation.

Brexit casts a big shadow over these important arrangements and the European Commission and the British Government have proposed that upon Brexit the TRQs will be split in half.

That poses a lot of difficulties for New Zealand exporters who have over a considerable period developed markets in both Britain and EU which they manage according to market trends and consumption patterns and in the light of flows of British products to the EU and European products to Britain.

Our exporters will lose considerable flexibility from the proposed splitting of the tariff rate quotas even though their right to export within the quota limits and rules has been guaranteed since 1995 – and I might add, effectively “bought and paid for” by New Zealand once already.

What’s more the European Commission and the British Government have in effect decided to proceed over the objections of New Zealand and other trading partners with similar arrangements – they risk opening up years of trade litigation in the WTO.

Now it has to be said these matters are not directly related to the FTA negotiation but they are very unhelpful for the effort to find a consensus around agricultural trade.

New Zealand for obvious reasons is wanting to expand on these tariff rate quotas but the EU and Britain are wanting to restrict them.

I’ll come back to this in a moment but New Zealand already paid a high price when Britain joined the European Community in 1973 – we are not minded to pay again now Britain wishes to leave.

A second issue also relates to agriculture.

The EU wishes New Zealand to adopt strict regulations about the way certain geographical names are used in international trade – not so much the use of names of wine regions like Champagne which is already restricted here, but names associated primarily with dairy products and some meat products.

This new strict regime would not just apply in New Zealand, but also to our exports into other markets.

Think feta cheese, mozzarella and parmesan.

New Zealand’s view is that these names have become generic rather than related to a certain geography.

Fonterra currently supplies large amounts of mozzarella cheese to China – every second pizza in China is covered with it, that’s a lot of pizza and a lot of cheese.

The EU has proposed the restriction of a large number of geographical indications which are presently being reviewed by our officials.

Some of them may not pose difficulties, others certainly will, but there is a principle at stake here and also significant commercial interests in trade with third countries.

The third potentially complex issue relates to digital trade.

Digital trade is the new black – all trade is rapidly becoming digital as goods are exchanged across e-commerce platforms and a wide variety of services are also delivered digitally to offshore consumers.

Think Alibaba for the former and as an example of the latter the way education or entertainment services are delivered by Internet.

This is a brave new world and there are distinctly different approaches to regulating issues like cross-border data flows, privacy and cybersecurity.

For example, on personal privacy, the EU approach, encapsulated in something called the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is highly precautionary.

GDPR requires even the most basic data about EU citizens, such as an email address, to be protected to the nth degree by any business that collects it – even if that business is situated around the other side of the world.

This potentially entails high added business costs and hassle.

New Zealand and others grouped in the CPTPP prefer a lighter-handed and more finely-tuned approach that allows cross border data flows and hence is trade-friendly, while also protecting those important objectives of privacy and cybersecurity in a way that is actually fit for purpose.

The EU has already recognised that New Zealand has its own very high privacy standards and has granted us something called “data adequacy”.

But resolving our differences across the broad sweep of digital trade issues in the FTA will be complicated.

Given the rapidly evolving digital world, this is not an area that is hugely familiar to many in the business community and we will want to tread carefully.

It is precisely this sort of complexity which delays the conclusion of trade agreements despite the best intentions of governments.

The Brexit conundrum

I want to touch on Brexit only briefly and I most particularly don’t want to get drawn into the Brexit debate itself which is something that must be decided by the British people.

The first and most obvious point to make is that Britain, despite the changes of the last fifty years, remains very important to New Zealand in political, economic and cultural terms.

New Zealand has an interest in an orderlyBrexit if indeed Brexit is what the British people wish to achieve.

And the converse also applies – we face risks, most particularly to trade and New Zealand businesses established in the UK if Brexit is disorderly.

The Brexit deal negotiated by Prime Minister May would have allowed the current arrangements to remain in place as they are now through to the end of 2020, while the detail of the future trade relationship with the EU was worked out.

Without a departure deal, or other action being taken, Britain will crash out from the EU on 29 March.

No comfy status quo through to the end of 2020 – just the “cliff edge” on 29 March, as some of the commentators have put it.

This risks significant disruption to supply chains,  to customs clearance at British ports and quite likely a significant dent in the British economy.

The British Government is interested in a future FTA with New Zealand.

That is a welcome prospect from our point of view and as with the EU there are both opportunities and challenges from a future FTA.

If a hard Brexit occurs on 29 March, Britain is able and will indeed be eager to negotiate and implement a future FTA with New Zealand as soon as possible, bearing in mind of course these things are always more difficult than politicians would have you believe.

For as long however as Britain remains a member of the EU Customs Union, including under any transition arrangement or if the so-called backstop is initiated, it may negotiate but not implement an FTA.

For New Zealand therefore, under hard Brexit, we face potentially short to medium term pain with the prospect of a future FTA on offer.

Under soft Brexit we face short to medium term continuity but an extensive delay to realising our FTA ambitions.

Bear in mind too that as long as Britain remains a member of the EU and the Customs Union it remains bound by any FTA we negotiate with the EU.

Bets are on as to which is achieved first – complete Brexit or NZ’s FTA with the EU.

Conclusions

New Zealand’s relations with the European Union and Britain are long-standing, for the most part very warm and important in political, economic and cultural terms.

We have different approaches to agricultural trade and always have.  Our approach to digital trade also differs.

On many other things we see the world in similar ways: that hopefully will provide a basis to see beyond our differences and work constructively to overcome them.

That may take time – these things always do and I’ll be the first person to applaud an early conclusion.

I’m also holding my breath for an outcome to Brexit which avoids a shock to the system any more than is necessary.

Future free trade agreements with the EU and eventually with Britain, if these can be achieved, provide a means not to go back to the future, but to look forward into the 21stcentury and put the relationship with these old friends and partners on a new level.

Trade in 2018 – still looking for that star !

Just as well the magi didn’t face tariffs at the border !  Here’s Stephen’s end of year round up!

 2018 will not go down in history as a good year for trade.  While international businesses struggled on, they did so against a backdrop of rising protectionism and all-out trade war between the world’s two largest economies. Will 2019 be any different?

 It sometimes said that not much changes in trade from year to year.  Not so in 2018 which was a year of two halves.

On the more positive side, some important new trade agreements were concluded.  Of course, here in New Zealand we’re thrilled about CPTPP* – a veritable mouthful of a trade agreement.  Rivalling it, if not in substance then at least in terms of an unpronounceable acronym, was USMCA*between US, Mexico and Canada – described unflatteringly by one commentator as “NAFTA O.8”. Then there was the linguistically more adventurous JEEPA – the Japan EU Economic Partnership Agreement.  Hats off to our Japanese friends – with CPTPP and JEEPA they have shown real global leadership in the cause of trade liberalisation (even if on agriculture they still need to fully overcome their worst instincts).

Trade restrictions, trade war, trade divorces

On the decidedly less positive side, protectionism has been let off the leash with trade restrictive measures in 2017-18 now seven times larger than recorded by the WTO in the previous period.  While the end of the year showed some, possibly only temporary, alleviation of the US China dispute, the consequences of the trade war have been felt in markets around the world as well as in the domestic economies of both presenting countries.  The impact on the WTO itself is most concerning. And de-stablising forces in the global trade architecture have also been felt in Europe, as the Brexit process has ground its way painfully towards an acrimonious UK-EU divorce.

What’s next for trade?

Where to for 2019?   The year will start on a positive note – CPTPP will enter into force for the six signatories with a first round of tariff cuts on 30 December with a second round for all except Japan on 1 January.  Japan’s second round of cuts will take place on 1 April. For Viet Nam entry into force and the two rounds of cuts take place on 14 January.  We expect at least one further accession to CPTPP in 2019, starting with the most likely candidate -Thailand.

Other important negotiations will continue during the year.  We are hopeful of progress with NZ/EUbut we are aware that these things take time and nothing will be concluded until everything is concluded.  We would be bold to forecast a conclusion to RCEP given past delays, but Ministers are on record saying this will happen by the end of the year.

On Brexit, who can possibly say what will happen?  There are differing views in our own team (here in the South Pacific!) but, notwithstanding the current polls, it does seem possible that calls for a second referendum will grow in intensity the closer we get to 29 March.    In November we published a discussion paper on New Zealand’s interest in a future FTA with the UK but much will depend on whether the UK exits the EU as planned on 29 March and on the shape of the future UK-EU relationship to be negotiated.  We forecast continuing uncertainty next year which is in itself corrosive to business and investor confidence.

Not out of the woods yet

We are not out of the woods on the trade war. President Trump’s dinner with President Xi at the G20 Summit resulted in a 90 day period during which both countries will refrain from new tariffs and return to the negotiating table.  That is positive, but a much-anticipated speech by President Xi on 18 December on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening up will perhaps have disappointed – no new measures were announced to address issues in the Chinese economy which cause concern not just for the US, but others as well.

Come next December we hope we are in a better place than today.  Trade negotiators like the magi continue to follow the star.  Let’s hope like them we can continue to move across borders without disruption!

*   (1) CPTPP = Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans Pacific Partnership

(2) USMCA = United States, Mexico, Canada Agreement

(3)  RCEP = Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

 

PM’s Europe visit – Stephen comments on Radio NZ website

Radio NZ asked Stephen to comment on PM Jacinda Ardern’s visit to London – read what he said here.

Earlier Stephen commented on the PM’s stops in Paris and Berlin – see here.

Finally Radio NZ asked Stephen to comment on Foreign Minister Winston Peters’ proposal for a Commonwealth Free Trade Agreement – not as unlikely as it sounds, see here.

Asia Pacific Integration – with or without the United States?

This is the text of an address Stephen gave to the Asia Forum in Wellington on 7 February 2017.

It’s good to be with you this evening and to have this early opportunity, as a new year unfolds, to speak about the outlook for trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region.

This year is definitely not a case of “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”. 

A new President in the White House is challenging the model of past American leadership in the global economy and with that long-held principles and practices of economic co-operation and integration.

This coincides with a new questioning around the world of the process of globalisation, how its benefits are shared and its challenges managed.

I am perhaps a little brave, at this early stage, in accepting Farib’s invitation to explore these issues – the President has been in office for less than a month (somehow it seems longer!) and his Administration is not yet completely in place.

I am certainly of the view that we need to let time elapse before being too definitive about the policy choices New Zealand might have to make in the light of these profound changes in the global environment.

It is not too early to start thinking about how we might position ourselves and so tonight I’d like to explore with you:

  • firstly, where the process of economic integration in the Asia Pacific region has led us thus far
  • secondly, how this process might be challenged in the months to come
  • and lastly, what we here in New Zealand need to be doing.

I’m speaking to you this evening mainly from the perspective of the NZ International Business Forum, a group of senior business leaders concerned with New Zealand’s engagement in the global economy.

These themes are relevant across the range of my work with organisations including the NZ China Council, the APEC Business Advisory Council and the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum.  

Economic integration – how far have we come?

One of the much repeated criticisms of the ill-fated Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) was that it was not a trade agreement at all.

I read as much in a recent blog on the website of the Foundation for Economic Education.

Rather than a simple agreement to lower tariffs for mutual benefit, the writer alleged, TPP morphed into a massive international regulatory regime over 5,000 pages long. It was weighed down by numerous non-trade provisions aimed at appeasing non-trade special interests”[1].

It’s not the purpose of my remarks tonight to attempt to rebut the many criticisms of TPP but this particular one calls for a little more economic education!

Of course TPP was a trade agreement – the larger part of those 5000 pages are taken up by complex schedules outlining the process for the elimination of tariffs.

(We can debate whether TPP is a “free” trade agreement since in some limited cases, albeit ones of interest to New Zealand, the goal of zero tariffs was not reached).

But there’s a much bigger picture here and it’s really not complicated – trade is not trade anymore.

Trade has been replaced by a set of much more complex economic interactions between firms and whole economies.

Professor Peter Petri and colleagues, in a report to ABAC in 2015, captured this well when he said:

“Businesses (today) engage in more varied activities, with a wider range of partners, and in more markets than ever. Major technological and economic trends are disrupting the business environment, including the emergence of global value chains, the digital/Internet revolution, the rise of a giant middle class, and dramatic improvements in connectivity[2].

Many of the objections to TPP overlook the fact that the business model in the region has changed and that global and regional value chains, where production occurs across multiple jurisdictions, are, in the words of Professor Petri, “an Asia Pacific innovation”.

New Zealand is not immune from this movement.

New Zealand manufacturers and processors of natural resources including food and forest products are suppliers into these global value chains.

As my friend John Ballingall from NZIER suggested in a recent op ed: “The days of Kiwi firms shipping butter and whole sides of lamb direct from the processing plant to the end consumer are long gone”[3].

Research undertaken by NZIER for the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) shows that while New Zealand is struggling to lift its overall participation in GVCs we do much better in relation to agriculture and food and beverage production.

To quote John Ballingall again:  “This world of global value chains (GVCs) poses a number of challenges and opportunities to Kiwi firms, and forces policy-makers to think in non-traditional ways. What’s been done in the past is unlikely to be ideal now as New Zealand looks to boost its productivity and living standards”.

It was precisely to try to find new ways of incentivising and enhancing access into these global value chains that TPP was conceived.

In that sense TPP represented an effort for the regional framework of rules for trade and investment to catch up with the action – even if in the end it was a very long and tortuous process.

Hence the need for the agreement to cover not just tariffs but non-tariff barriers, not just goods but services, not just trade but investment, not just border measures but behind the border measures, not simply regulatory harmonisation – as the writer of that blog contends – but processes for regulatory coherence and convergence, not “one size fits all” but “one fit for all sizes”.

I promised this wouldn’t become an apologia for TPP but simply put TPP was trying, in all its insufficiency, to reflect the new reality of the way business is done in the region and beyond.

The fact of the matter is that business is moving faster than the regulatory system and has been doing so for some time.

TPP was one instrument for achieving economic integration – certainly something less than the utopia of free trade but a very good second best option.

TPP is not the whole answer either – it is a coalition of twelve willing partners, which was always designed to lead to something much larger, an APEC-wide grouping gathered together in the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).

Nor is TPP the only such pathway to FTAAP.

In Asia there is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

I’m tempted (but it would be unkind) to describe RCEP as a coalition of 16 unwilling partners, given the rather limited level of ambition, which seems to characterise the negotiating process.

It is important to stress that RCEP is not the forum in which China, as our American friends would have it, “is writing the rules for the region”.

RCEP is led by ASEAN, not China, and while on paper seeks an ambitious outcome, is mostly about ASEAN integration with the rest of East Asia.

For its part China remains very interested in the concept of the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).

In his address to the APEC CEO Summit in Lima last November President Xi Jinping described FTAAP as a strategic choice concerning the long-term prosperity of the Asia-Pacific; We should steadfastly promote its construction and provide institutional guarantees for fostering an open regional economy”[4].

President Xi also expressed a preference for inclusiveness:

Any regional trade arrangement, in order to earn broad support, must be open, inclusive and all-win; closed or exclusive pacts are not the right choice”.

Finding a way to realise the FTAAP vision has been difficult.

The theory was that TPP and RCEP, once concluded, would coalesce into FTAAP which would be anointed by the coming together of China and the United States in a new framework which could spark life into a global process in the World Trade Organisation.

Hope clearly springs eternal in the realm of trade negotiations!

Challenges to the existing order

The arrival of President Trump in the White House has clearly put paid to much of this grand strategy – at least for the time being.

His decision to withdraw from TPP was easily done, if fundamentally flawed – after all, he was withdrawing from a treaty that had not come into force, the benefits of which had not been fully seen.

But there are broader issues at play.

His “America First” policies, including the call to bring businesses back to the USA, pose a direct challenge to the prevailing business model in the region.

His stated preference for bilateral deals runs counter to the quest for a region-wide framework of rules for trade and investment.

These rules seek to make doing business easier while avoiding the infamous “noodle bowl” effect of conflicting and overlapping disciplines.

Any future adventurism in US foreign policy, particularly with regard to China, could serve to destabilise the stability and security of the region.

This stability is a necessary pre-requisite for advancing economic and commercial interests.

All of this reverses former President Obama’s policy of seeking to engage more directly in the region through the “Asia pivot” of which TPP became, more by association than by design, the flag-bearer.

It may well be of course that these worst fears may not be realised – as I said, these are very early days in the life of new Administration.

But even at this point it is not hard to see that there could be a departure from what we have known of American leadership in the region.

In a recent memo the respected head of the American think-tank CSIS, John Hamre, writes that we are back in 1949 – a time when President Truman faced an existential choice about whether to concentrate on domestic growth and competitiveness at the expense of global recovery after World War II.

Hamre writes – we are back to the great challenge that faced President Truman. Will America shake off its deep- seated desire to pull back and nurse its bruises, or will it champion an international order designed to create a broad environment where human potential can blossom?[5]

It was after all American leadership, which imposed a benign order on the region after the conflict of the last century.

It was this leadership, which helped secure the emergence of the World Trade Organisation as the repository of trade law and a framework for settling disputes

It is this leadership, which has in more recent times, trialled new arrangements for trade liberalisation through NAFTA and a range of other agreements, and helped shape the new business model we see today in the region.

This is not to say that the existing order is either perfect or sufficient – clearly it was not.

In the economic space that order has come under intense criticism.

There has been criticism for failing to take sufficient account of environmental and sustainability issues.

There has been a perceived failure to ensure that those who are disadvantaged from the adjustment brought about by changing patterns of production and trade are appropriately cared for and helped into new areas of enterprise.

And there is the criticism that economic integration has served to advance the interests of multinational corporations especially through measures aimed at stimulating and protecting investment or through the rules being devised for the digital economy.

“Making globalisation work for people” is not just a slogan – it has become a policy imperative in the age of Brexit and Trump.

So, in 2017, we face not only the prospect of new direction from the United States on trade, we face new challenges from within about the nature of the very order that has served us well in the past.

 What should New Zealand do?

In this context, what is to be done by a small, open, trade-dependent economy like New Zealand?

It needs to be recognised that this is not the first time the core assumptions of New Zealand’s trade policy have been challenged.

When Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973 we faced the herculean task of diversifying our economy while hanging on tooth and nail to our access for butter and sheepmeat.  (How ironic that today we’re back again talking with Europe and Britain!)

In 1983 we sought to break out of a straightjacket of protectionism and economic befuddlement when we concluded CER with our best friends the Australians – that living and evolving agreement remains a bedrock of New Zealand economic success.

In 1993 when the outcome of the GATT Uruguay Round was in doubt, we made it known that New Zealand was open to the concept of high quality and comprehensive trade deals in the Asia Pacific region.

That ultimately led to FTAs with Singapore, Chile, P4, ASEAN, China and TPP – this sort of FTA coverage was unthinkable back in the day.

Today we see that New Zealand’s Plan A, focused largely if not exclusively around TPP, has gone off the boil and Plan B, is, to quote Prime Minister English, “tricky”.

What is Plan B for New Zealand?

It is certainly not a retreat into “fortress New Zealand” which makes no sense for a nation so dependent on trade and economic integration.

Nor is it a futile attempt to keep away from the controversial aspects of TPP and seek to negotiate more limited “market access only deals” – this merely denies the reality of value chains.

New Zealand after all is already largely a free market for others’ exports – most of them don’t see the need to reciprocate.

One key advantage today, which was not the case in 1973, 1983 or 1993, is that we have options.

Plan B is likely going to be a mix of things, both in the Asia Pacific region and beyond.

Among the latter are the emerging NZ/EU FTA and a possible post Brexit FTA with Britain.

Among the former are the initiative to upgrade our bilateral FTA with China and new initiatives like China’s “One Belt, One Road”, which we need to examine more deeply.

We certainly need to continue to seek a high quality, comprehensive and ambitious outcome from RCEP.

RCEP may not at present be an alternative to TPP, but is a useful initiative none the less, particularly for New Zealand if it delivers for us better access to Japan and India which we currently lack.

Then there the prospect of a TPP-like agreement amongst the remaining 11 members.

Australia, New Zealand and Singapore have expressed interest in exploring the options and Mexico has signalled that it wishes to explore bilateral agreements with the remaining members.

Japan, a key player, has recently said TPP is “meaningless” without the United States.

I think this Japanese reticence is entirely understandable and needs to be seen in the context of their critical security relationship with the United States.

On the other hand, Japan, like New Zealand and unlike other members, has already ratified TPP.

We need to let some quiet diplomacy proceed to see if the remaining 11 parties, or a sub-set of them, see merit in amending TPP to take account of US withdrawal.

This should include deciding whether or not to strip out of the agreement those things that were essentially US demands.

TPP (11) would not deliver the long sought-after FTA with the United States.

While China – under our shortly to be upgraded FTA – may have replaced the United States as our top trading partner, the US remains as important to us today as it was the day before the Presidential inauguration.

America is not just a major trade and investment partner – it is a powerhouse of innovation, entrepreneurship and business ideas.

New Zealand now has to find a way to engage and work constructively with the new Administration, even as we look to advance other options for growing and future-proofing our economy.

The way ahead is far from easy.

New Zealand has been seeking to obtain a bilateral FTA with the United States since the turn of the century.

Two problems have bedevilled that effort: first, a poor political and security relationship, which has now been fixed, thanks to efforts over years by certain politicians and diplomats on both sides, supported by leaders from business and the wider community gathered in the NZ US Council and its counterpart in the United States.

And second, on the economic front, the small size of the New Zealand economy and the perceived – if highly exaggerated – risk which our agricultural sector poses to American farmers.

This will make it difficult for New Zealand to get ahead in the FTA queue and may make a purely bilateral agreement ultimately no easier to negotiate than TPP.

While we simply do not know the detail of the new President’s trade policy, he is not likely to do us favours on agriculture and may seek to go beyond the TPP outcomes on issues like investment and intellectual property, especially medicines.

There is also the challenge of seeking improved visa access to enable New Zealand professionals to work temporarily in the US as many services exporters especially in the tech sector would wish.

To return to my favourite theme, there is much irony here – TPP’s lengthy negotiation was in part because the other 11 partners were seeking to counter the full extent of American ambition across a range of issues.

This was largely achieved: the final TPP text was a carefully structured consensus, which represented a balance of interests of all parties.

For New Zealand TPP delivered substantial benefits with little change to existing policies, even if we did not achieve all we hoped.

Conclusion

Will economic integration proceed with or without the United States?

The theme for my remarks this evening was framed as a question but perhaps it should have been an exclamation!

Economic integration driven by globalisation and commercial impetus is likely to proceed whether the United States ultimately decides to lead that process or not.

There may be holes in the boat, but it is not sinking – yet.

The question is more what sort of economic integration are we going to see and what will be the rule-making that shapes it.

New Zealand benefits from rules for trade and investment especially when we have had a hand in making them.

New Zealand does not have the luxury of closing off options before they have been fully explored.

We’ve been in this space before.

Today we are entering a new and uncertain period where old assumptions may no longer hold true, where old economic allies may not play the role we have become accustomed to.

This profound change requires fresh thinking from governments and stakeholders, together with perseverance and commitment, as we chart some new and potentially rough waters.

 



[1] Iain Murray: “Free Traders shouldn’t mourn the loss of the TPP” –https://fee.org/articles/free-traders-shouldnt-mourn-the-loss-of-the-tpp/

accessed 1 February 2017

[2] Peter A Petri et al: “The FTAAP Opportunity – a report to ABAC”, October 2015 – https://www2.abaconline.org/assets/2015/4%20Manila/FTAAP%20OPPORTUNITY%20(1).pdf accessed 1 February 2015

 

[5] John Hamre; “Memorandum to CSIS Trustees, Advisers and Friends”, 1 February 2017

Trade and resilient agri-business

Stephen spoke to the Federated Farmers’ annual conference in Wellington on 2 July.  Read his speech here.

Resilience is about equipping farmers to survive and prosper in the face of external shocks and stresses – be they climate-related, or pests and diseases, or to do with currency or some other economic factor.

Trade agreements that level the playing field have enhanced New Zealand farmers’ international competitiveness, and greatly expanded our options in terms of diversified markets.

More open trade has given New Zealand farmers strength and flexibility to withstand the shocks of drought, or events like PSA, or a high dollar, or going head to head with massively subsidised competitors.

It is trade that links food supply from New Zealand with rising demand in global markets and the changing needs of global consumers.

Emerging trade agreements

Stephen spoke to the Primary Industry Summit in Wellington on 25 May.  Read his speech here.

I’d like to start today by asking the question – why do we seek negotiate trade agreements in the first place, especially when they seem so hard to I’ll then give you a sense of where I, as business observer, think some of the more current FTA negotiations are up to.

I’d also like to venture some thoughts about what all this might mean for the primary industries.

Walking the talk in Vladivostok

Stephen recounts what happened on and off stage at this year’s APEC meeting in Russia.

Click on the link above to read this article on the New Zealand International Business Forum website.

From Russia with love – Stephen writes from the APEC meeting in Vladivostok

Stephen Jacobi writes from the APEC meeting in Vladivostok

Click on the link above to read the article on the National Business Review website.

Joint Statement: NZUS Council and TPP business leaders – Finish an ambitious TPP in 2013, say Asia Pacific business leaders

Read the Joint Statement from the NZUS Council and TPP business leaders

Click on the link above to read the media release available on the Scoop Independent News website.